Suchergebnisse

Sexual violence is a prevalent feature of war with severe physical, psychological, and social consequences for survivors. Yet we have a limited understanding of how survivors relate to their political environment after the conflict ends. We analyze individual-level survey data on postwar Sri Lanka to assess whether wartime sexual victimization relates to political activism. Connecting unobtrusive measures from a list experiment to individual survivors' political action, we show that personal experience of sexual violence increases political participation. This effect is substantial in size, holds for institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political action, and is robust to unobserved confounding or sample selection bias. Causal mediation analyses suggest that survivors of wartime sexual violence mobilize politically through their involvement in civic networks. The findings stress the relevance of survivors' agency and contribute to a better understanding of wartime sexual violence, the role of civil society in post-conflict politics, and of humanitarian policy.

How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As "tried and tested" agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a "fall-back option", which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.

How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As "tried and tested" agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a "fall-back option", which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.

In this paper, we study the impact that might be derived from the main housing tenure modes between home- ownership or renting in Spain on several outcomes that indicate the educational attainment of children. With this objective, we analyze, from the point of view of the treatment effect literature at a microeconometric level, the data from the European Union Household Panel during 2000. We conclude that there is not any empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the children from owners and renters do show any difference in terms of educational attainment. ; En este trabajo se estudia para el ámbito español el impacto que podría tener la forma de tenencia de la vivienda principal en propiedad o en alquiler sobre distintas variables indicativas del nivel educativo alcanzado por los hijos. Con este objetivo, analizamos desde el punto de vista de la literatura de efectos de un tratamiento a nivel microeconométrico los datos proporcionados para el año 2000 por el Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea. Concluimos que no existe evidencia empírica que soporte la hipótesis de que los hijos de los propietarios y de los inquilinos presentan diferencias en términos de nivel de estudios completados.

Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military's disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our suggested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects.

In the past, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) rarely publicized their work. In the 1990s, a few began to publish booklets and brochures for popular consumption and to establish ties with the media. These days, SAIs are concerned about communication. A communication policy completes their cycle of accountability, justifies their existence, is an essential component of their independence and efficiency and brings about measures which assess the impact of their work.The aim of this article is to analyse the latest communication strategies developed by SAIs in order to publicize the results of their activity and to provide the public with an overall vision of what they do. The study, based on a questionnaire sent out to European Union SAIs, highlights the fact that these bodies undertake wide-ranging communication activities involving a close relationship with the media and the use of Internet websites.Points for practitioners This article explores the most recent developments in European Union SAI communication strategy. Based on survey research, the study concludes that SAIs maintain a close relationship with the media and have been able to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Internet to publish their results and to provide users with an overview of their work. For SAIs, this analysis allows them to be graded in terms of their relationship with the media and how they use Internet websites. Hence it will be possible to establish criteria leading to improvements or maintenance of their relative situation.

It has been long known that some regions of the genome are more susceptible to damage and mutagenicity than others. Recent advances have determined a critical role of chromatin both in the incidence of damage and in its repair. Thus, chromatin arises as a guardian of the stability of the genome, which is altered in cancer cells. In this review, we focus into the mechanisms by which chromatin influences the occurrence and repair of the most cytotoxic DNA lesions, double-strand breaks, in particular at actively transcribed chromatin or related to DNA replication. ; Research in AA's lab is funded by the European Research Council, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Junta de Andalucía and the European Union (FEDER).

When governments face severe political violence, they regularly respond with violence. Yet not all governments escalate repression under such circumstances. We argue that to understand the escalation of state violence, we need to pay attention to the potential costs leaders might face in doing so. We expect that the decision to escalate state violence is conditional on being faced with heightened threats and on possessing an information advantage that mitigates the expected cost of increasing state violence. In an environment where media freedom is constrained, leaders can deny or reframe an escalation of violations and so expect to reduce potential domestic and international costs attached to that decision. Using a global dataset from 1981 to 2006, we show that state violence is likely to escalate in response to increasing violent threats to the state when media freedom is curtailed – but not when the media are free from state intervention. A media environment that the government knows is free to sound the alarm is associated with higher political costs of repression and effectively reduces the risk of escalating state violence, even in the face of mounting armed threats.

Dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, yet violent and nonviolent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims, and why in some cases these organizational claims result in civil wars or nonviolent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the organized articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and nonviolent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 101 states from 1960 to 2012. We show that factors such as demography, economic development, and civil society have differential effects on these different stages and outcomes of mobilization. We demonstrate that the common finding that anocracies are more prone to civil war primarily stems from such regimes being more prone to see maximalist political demands that could lead to violent mobilization, depending on other factors conducive to creating focused military capacity. We find that non-democracy generally promotes nonviolent campaigns as anocracies and autocracies are both more likely to experience claims and more prone to nonviolent campaigns, conditional on claims.